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I.-105 
THE COMMON LAW INSIDE A SOCIAL 
HIERARCHY: POWER OR REASON? 
KATHARINE SILBAUGH* 
Abstract: Anita Bernstein argues that the common law gives women, too, the 
right to say no to what they do not want. She demonstrates that the common law 
is a far-reaching defense of condoned self-regard, a system that allows individu-
als to place their own interests above the interests of others, particularly when 
seeking to exclude others. She, therefore, places in the common law a right to 
protection from rape and a near-absolute right to expel a pregnancy. Bernstein 
reasons that women’s exclusion from the common law right to say no was a mis-
take produced by their absence from the judiciary. This review argues an alterna-
tive explanation for the gap between reality and faithful reasoning: the common 
law is an elegant tool in the pantheon of tools used to create and defend social, 
economic, and civic hierarchy. The common law, precisely because it is undemo-
cratic, has been a useful instrument to test-drive rationalizations for the status 
quo, including the status quo of identity hierarchies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Anita Bernstein’s The Common Law Inside the Female Body is an amaz-
ing book. It is as learned as any organization of the common law, and even bet-
ter for combining the kind of painstaking detail one loves about the common 
law with the perspectives of the excluded. Her analysis is multi-disciplinary, 
drawing on popular culture and contemporary statutes, ancient medical 
knowledge and practices, and the giant thinkers about the common law of 
yore, from Blackstone to Bentham. Her method is itself the message: how rich 
is the common law? Bernstein shows, with texture and force, that the common 
law is so rich as to include the negative rights of the female body. Her thor-
oughness, depth, and care are themselves in the best traditions of common law 
thinking, in that, so many of her ideas are carefully qualified, going as far as 
they go only, with generous room for debate explicitly set out at all turns.1 I 
admire her methodology, knowledge, intellectual temperament, humor, and 
most of all, the story she is telling about the common law. This is a must read. 
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I. REASONING THAT NO MEANS NO 
Bernstein’s thesis, in its simplest form, is that the common law gives 
women, too, the right to say no to what they do not want. She demonstrates 
that the common law is a far-reaching defense of condoned self-regard, a sys-
tem that allows individuals to place their own interests above the interests of 
others, particularly when seeking to exclude others. Keep Off of real property, 
the castle doctrine in defense of a home, the requirements of agreement and 
consideration in contract law before obligations can be imposed, the Good 
Samaritan rule’s refusal to impose un-consenting obligations, and even more 
obscure claims such as trover, are some of the many well-understood doctrines 
that restate this right to say no to what we do not want. Taken as a whole, the 
common law is dedicated to negative liberty: you cannot cross a boundary into 
the personal space or identity of another person. From this premise, Bernstein 
finds first a right to avoid rape, and second, a near absolute right to expel a 
pregnancy from the female body.2 
Bernstein boldly sets out an essentialist understanding of negative liber-
ties expressed in the common law, citing animal studies about aversions to in-
trusion as freely as she cites the political history of the Magna Carta. She lo-
cates condoned self-regard at the center of the common law and proves its cen-
trality to legal doctrine in seven particular essences: the right to avoid physical 
trauma at the hands of another; the right to avoid invasions of interests in land 
and the spaces we possess or live in; the right to avoid bodily confinement; the 
right to avoid encounters that are hurtful to our dignity and tranquility; protec-
tion from losses or takings of chattels; and the right not to do something in fur-
therance of an agenda we do not share. Taken together, these are our negative 
rights embedded in the common law, and she demonstrates each with support 
from the common law of property, crime, tort, and contract. She knows how 
negative rights are stingy when compared to their counterpart, positive rights, 
and she is fine seeing positive rights appear in constitutions or in statutes. She 
knows that the protection of common law rights can give way to statutes. Her 
argument is only that the common law states a fundamental set of basic nega-
tive claims, and her mission is to turn our focus as common law critics away 
from disappointing common law doctrines such as coverture.3 Coverture was a 
problem, perhaps not as big as we thought (it disadvantaged wives, not wom-
en, she notes), but it is not the heart of the common law for the female body, 
says Bernstein.4 After finding each of the seven negative rights within the 
common law as well as within human nature, she creates her defense of protec-
tion from rape and a near absolute right to expel a pregnancy, and claims that 
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the common law does already encompass these rights for a woman to say no to 
what she does not want, and always has.5 
She realizes that the case for avoiding rape is less controversial, and in-
deed is explicitly reflected in common law criminal doctrine in theory. There-
fore, many readers will focus their attention on her more contentious claim that 
the common law guarantees a nearly absolute right of abortion: 
Individuals hold—and as long as the common law has been in place, 
they have always held—a legal right to terminate their pregnancies. 
Their desire not to be pregnant is the only reason they need to exer-
cise this common law right. Legal entitlement to end one’s pregnan-
cy existed in the law of crimes, torts, property, contracts, and equity, 
read separately and together, long before the U.S. Supreme Court 
sited it in the Constitution.6 
To arrive at her defense of abortion, Bernstein’s deploys a spatial essen-
tialism in the human right to dominion over personal space, and defends her 
spatial theory with the common law property defenses such as the castle doc-
trine, as well as contemporary psychological studies of boundaryless bullpen 
workplaces, among other supports for her argument.7 Readers will debate 
whether she has adequately dispensed with the proposition that sexual conduct 
is an undertaking sufficient to give rise to an obligation to a fetus; I think she 
has, but abortion skeptics will focus on this fundamental aspect of her argu-
ment and find room to disagree with her characterization. Perhaps because this 
argument is the more controversial one, I admire the case she has made all the 
more, both for her courage and for how cogently she has marshaled the author-
ity of the common law. If the common law is to be believed, if the common 
law is sincere, Bernstein has made the case that it must afford women the bodi-
ly right to say “keep off” to a fetus/Zef. She sets out her challenge to scholars:  
“I dare a foe of the common law inside the female body to say that women do 
not share in the right of self-defense.”8 There can be no balancing of interests, 
contrary to the constitutional framework set out by the United States Supreme 
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey9 and Roe v. Wade.10 
II. THE POWER TO BE HEARD SAYING NO? 
I admire deeply the defense Bernstein has made of the common law’s system 
of rights, but I am uncertain that I am convinced, even as convincing as she is. 
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As an aspiration, as an elaboration of the very best case for the proposition, I 
cannot imagine anything better. She has reasoned persuasively from the com-
mon law rationales. But whether she has started from the right premises about 
the common law, I am uncertain. If Bernstein is right that the common law is a 
good defender of all people from basic intrusions, and always has been, then 
she is right that it protects a woman from rape and gives her a nearly absolute 
right to expel a pregnancy. But an alternative conclusion could be drawn from 
her convincing work. One could conclude that because the common law, does 
not, in fact protect women in the way it protects men, a conclusion she herself 
details in the final pages of the book11, that failure requires an explanation. She 
has shown that any sincere and faithful interpretation of the premises of the 
common law would do so. Indeed, Bernstein is caring and aware in the horror 
she feels over the brutality of the system of slavery, a system defended and 
supported by the very common law she seeks to elevate. She does not flinch 
from detailing its brutality and the common law’s complicity in that violence. 
Bernstein is painstaking in her acknowledgment of the failures of the common 
law to protect enslaved people, as well as to protect women. She does, though, 
believe that the common law that enabled the institution of slavery was bas-
tardized, not the true common law: “That the common law and slavery do not 
coherently coexist is clear, I hope: but less obvious is the power the common 
law would have had against the enslavement of American human beings if 
condoned self-regard, its hallmark, had been understood as something that all 
persons enjoy.”12 
Some explanation is needed for the gap between the operation of the 
common law to enable the profound, transgressive violence of slavery, as well 
as the minimization of sexual violence and the forced service to another if the 
other is a fetus, on the one hand, and the theory that Bernstein sets out, which 
asserts that the institution of slavery is diabolically contrary to the negative 
liberties defended by the common law, on the other. 
Bernstein’s explanation for the gap between reality and faithful reasoning 
is that a mistake has been made, a misunderstanding fueled by a lack of diverse 
representation among common law judges and litigators. Let’s look at Bern-
stein’s argument for why the common law missed labeling slavery an atrocity: 
“The common law went along with a pernicious ‘accommodation process’ be-
cause it was blinkered by skewed membership in its decision-making ranks. 
Misunderstanding about who counted obscured what it did and failed to do.”13 
These were misunderstandings, not a purpose. Judges were not weaponizing 
common law reasoning in order to exploit, they were deploying it sincerely, 
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albeit blinkered by their own white male propertied identity. In her words, 
“[e]xclusion generated more exclusion.”14 Her common law judges accidental-
ly and mistakenly dehumanized enslaved people, just as they accidentally sub-
ordinate women’s personhood to their ability to nurture a fetus. They made a 
mistake about the personhood of women and enslaved people in their other-
wise neutral application of the common law. 
The alternative explanation for that gap between reality and faithful rea-
soning is that the common law is an elegant tool in the pantheon of tools used 
to create and defend social, economic, and civic hierarchy. I am left feeling 
that despite her intentions, Bernstein has proved that common law reasoning is 
more rationalization for abuse of power and exploitation than it is a sincere 
defense of negative rights. If it were an accident of underrepresentation, would 
it retain its stickiness over centuries and to the present? 
I offer up the question that stuck with me throughout my read: does Bern-
stein’s narrative place too much faith in reasoning and discount too much the 
instrumental role of reasoning in power and domination? A different theory of 
the common law is that the “haves” used and use the reasoning process of the 
common law to gather, organize, maintain, and deploy power over outgroups. I 
do not here pretend to ground this alternative theory in case law or treatises in 
the way that Bernstein has grounded its opposite. Its proof is only in the com-
mon law’s actual failure to extend negative rights to outgroups in practice, 
when they need it the most. I only raise questions about the extent to which 
Bernstein’s argument and analysis depend on minimizing power dynamics, on 
placing them outside of the common law itself, and on characterizing their oc-
casional leaks into the common law as mistakes. I ask whether retaining power 
over outgroups is a feature of the common law, not a bug, its function, not a 
side-effect. I would characterize Bernstein’s beautiful treatise as an effort to 
prove that domination is a bug, not a feature, of the common law. The concept 
of power as such hardly appears in her analysis, though the brutality of im-
proper uses of the common law are acknowledged throughout. 
Bernstein sees the critics coming, conceding that “in the past women have 
arrived at the scene of largesse to find riches no longer there.”15 Her argument 
is designed to be counter-intuitive to this relatively obvious question I am ask-
ing—whether subordination is a feature or a bug of the common law. So my 
next question, given that she knows this question is coming, is why is her ex-
planation for the gap necessary? Why is it necessary to characterize the justifi-
cation of slavery as a misunderstanding? Because Bernstein’s project is to re-
habilitate the uncorrupted core of the common law, the hallmark of condoned 
self-regard. If it were purpose and not misunderstanding, feature and not bug, 
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the entire loving analysis of the common law premise for women’s ability to 
say no to what they do not want loses force. The foundation becomes shaky. 
This matters. 
Why does it matter? The final pages of the book catalog all of the ways 
that the common law does, in fact, fail women’s ability to exercise condoned 
self-regard, and Bernstein observes that “women, as I keep saying, have not 
shared in all the bounty of the common law that is rightfully theirs.” 16 One 
example will suffice: the common law right of self-defense against violent in-
truders has “been understood not to apply when threats originate in the defend-
er’s household,” meaning that it does not apply when it would be most useful 
to women, who are most likely to be attacked by an intimate partner.17 Is this 
still a misunderstanding grounded in the identity of common law judges? My 
suspicion is that the common law, personified, never meant for us to take its 
protections this literally, this sincerely. Undoubtedly the common law allows 
change and consistency. But domination arguments, meaning sugar-coated jus-
tifications for domination, are shape shifters, adapting to the particular justifi-
catory environment of their era, but ever reconstituting to get their work done. 
Bernstein makes her convincing proof. But that does not mean women gain the 
absolute rights the common law purportedly grants.  
This makes one ask: can we analogize our way out of a power struggle? 
Can Bernstein’s entirely persuasive case that abortion and avoiding rape fall 
easily within the common law’s articulated conception of negative rights give 
rise to a concession by courts that women do in fact have a right grounded in 
the common law to expel a pregnancy? Could that right form the backdrop to 
any statute in derivation of that common law foundation? The common law, 
precisely because it is undemocratic, has been a useful instrument to test-drive 
rationalizations for the status quo, including the status quo of identity hierar-
chies. Power struggles, if that is what is really at stake, play out in legislatures, 
where action is grounded in popular power rather than in the kind of reasoning 
characteristic of the common law. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken on its own terms, this book is a treasure, and I am profoundly 
grateful to Bernstein. But I cannot help but read this extraordinary work as a 
compelling argument that the common law has been about inter-group pow-
er—almost exactly the opposite conclusion that Bernstein draws. Her case, 
once made, is so complete as to seem irrefutable. And yet the book ends with a 
walk through all of the ways that courts fail to implement her understanding. 
How can that be? How can the common law thoroughly protect, always have 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See, e.g., id. at 180. 
 17 Id. at 197. 
2020] The Common Law Inside a Social Heirarchy  I.-111 
protected, women’s ability to say no to what they do not want, yet fail to do so 
in common law courts? I find myself wondering whether Bernstein is bringing 
reasoning to a knife fight. 
